.
And its market share changes from ↵ ⇤⇤ = 1 2
. As a result, the gain from deviation is
.
By adding
1 2 Q(µ ⇤⇤ ) (from (A8)), and cµ i = + (µ ⇤⇤ u+u T ) t + 2 µ i to the last term, we get:
We can rearrange it to
From (A8), we know µ ⇤⇤ (4c 2 ) = µ ⇤⇤ 2 (2 ) + 2µ ⇤⇤ ( + We first show the gain is decreasing in µ ⇤⇤ , and then it is negative for µ ⇤⇤ = µ ⇤ . Therefore, opt-out is not profitable for µ ⇤⇤ µ ⇤ . CLAIM 1: The gain from opt-out is decreasing in µ ⇤⇤ :
The derivative of the gain with respect to µ ⇤⇤ is t(4c 2 )(µ
We can replace (4c 2 )µ 0 i by and t(4c 2 )(µ ⇤⇤ µ i ) from (B1). Hence,
which is negative since 2u T u.
23 Since t is a constant, we can consider the gain as
CLAIM 2:
The gain from opt-out is negative for µ ⇤⇤ = µ ⇤ :
We know:
The last term is negative, according to A1, and A2. Therefore,
which is less than
Therefore, the gain from opt-out is negative for all µ ⇤⇤ µ ⇤ . And since µ ⇤⇤ > 1 implies µ ⇤⇤ > µ ⇤ opt-out is not beneficial if µ ⇤⇤ > 1.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
(ii) First, we show ⇡ ⇤⇤ ⇡ ⇤ is decreasing with c. Given µ ⇤⇤ > 1, we consider two cases:
To show ⇡ ⇤⇤ ⇡ ⇤ is decreasing in c, we write
From proposition 1, we know cµ ⇤ = 4 + 4 + 4 µ ⇤ . Moreover, full di↵eren-tiating of Q(µ ⇤⇤ (c), c) in (A7), and multiplying it by µ ⇤⇤ gives us
Hence,
, we get
where for the second equality, we use (A7). The left term on the R.H.S. of the equality is always negative since c > 24 , and
where the first inequality is implied by A1, u T u max{
, implies h(c) is decreasing in c, and the proof 24 In (a), we assumed c
. Since 2, we can conclude c is done. Therefore, we assume the right term is positive. Hence,
Now, we show the left term on the R.H.S. of the inequality is decreasing in
PROOF:
where the last equality and inequality are implied by (A7), 2cµ
, and c
Therefore, we can write
where the last inequality is implied by u T 2. Therefore, The R.H.S is decreasing in u T . Hence,
This implies h 0 (c) is negative, or equivalently h(c) is decreasing in c.
2 : In this case,
25 In (a), we assumed c
. Since 2, we can conclude c , where the last inequality is implied by the fact  1.
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We can write (9) as:
where the inequality is obtained from
So far we have shown ⇡ ⇤⇤ ⇡ ⇤ is strictly decreasing with c, and gets positive values for c < 2 + 2 + 4 . To prove (ii) it is su cient to show ⇡ ⇤⇤ ⇡ ⇤ gets negative values for some values of c. Assume c is such that µ ⇤  µ ⇤⇤ = 1 , and
B1. Extension I: asymmetric issues
In the baseline model, we assumed that all issues are of equal importance in terms of probability of click, which is not realistic. We discuss here what happens if we assume that some issues (such as those covering major events) have a higher probability of click than the other issues. Let S ⌘ S A [ S B where S A \ S B = ;. Given a high-quality article, the probability for a reader to click its link is p A (p B ) if the issue covered by the article belongs to S A (S B ), with p A > p B . The probability of click is zero for low-quality articles. If the di↵erence between p A and p B is large enough and the measure of S A is not too large, regardless of the presence of the aggregator, both newspapers will cover all issues in S A with high quality (i.e., both newspapers cover major events with high-quality articles). Therefore, we can interpret u 0 as the utility from reading a home page and highquality articles covering major events, which makes the assumption u 0 > t more 7 easily satisfied. In addition, assumption A3 is relaxed as follows:
Since this extension is isomorphic to the baseline model, we can conclude that the aggregator induces newspapers to specialize in the coverage of the issues belonging to S B (i.e., those which are not major events of the day but have important social concerns such as climate change, income inequality etc.) and to increase the quality of the articles on these issues.
B2. Extension II: imperfect certification technology
When each newspaper provides an article of di↵erent quality on a given issue, let (1+ P )/2 (respectively, (1 P )/2) represent the probability for the aggregator to provide the link to the high-quality article (respectively, to the low-quality article) where P 2 [0, 1]. P = 1 corresponds to the case of perfect certification technology in the baseline model. Our main results extend to the case of imperfect certification technology; the detailed analysis can be found in the supplementary materials.
First, Proposition 3 extends to the case of imperfect certification technology. We show that the specialization strategy is a dominant strategy under A1. Assuming that i's profit is concave with respect to µ i , 26 we also prove that there exist two thresholds of such that µ ⇤⇤ = 0 for all  ( P ) and µ ⇤⇤ = 1 2 for all ¯ ( P )(> ( P ) and that µ ⇤⇤ strictly increases with for 2 ⇥ ( P ),¯ ( P ) ⇤ . In order to perform quality comparison, we also rely on the result from the empirical papers (Athey, Mobius and Pal (2015) and Chiou and Tucker (2012)). Namely, an increase in the third-party content u T increases tra c to the two newspapers for a given equilibrium quality of the newspapers. This implies
Using this condition, we find that Proposition 4(i) extends such that the presence of the aggregator increases quality. Furthermore, we find that the newspaper quality increases with the certification quality (i.e., @µ ⇤⇤ /@ P ) as noisier certification weakens the readership-expansion e↵ect.
Finally, we find that the e↵ect of P on newspapers' profits is ambiguous. However, as the aggregator's certification technology becomes less accurate, the business-stealing e↵ect is more likely to dominate the readership-expansion e↵ect, which tends to decrease newspapers' profits. This finding o↵ers a possible explanation for newspapers' complaint against Google News: they may find Google's algorithm to select news articles too noisy, resulting in low profits for them.
From now on, we prove the results we previously described about the extension. The utility that a reader with location x obtains from the aggregator is:
The utility from newspaper 1 is not a↵ected by P .
Therefore, market share of newspaper 1 is given by:
and by computing @↵ 1 /@µ 1 , we can show there exists a unique thresholdP in (0, 1) such that @↵ 1 /@µ 1  0 if and only if P P .
In
Step 3 and Step 4 of the proof, we restrict attention to the case in which the quality without aggregator is interior (i.e., µ ⇤ < 1/2), which is equivalent to c > 2 + 4 + 2 .
Step 1. -The profit of newspaper 1 is:
where
There are two cases: a) µ 1  µ 2 : Maximum di↵erentiation is a dominant strategy if and only if µ 1  g(µ 1 , µ 2 ), or equivalently:
1 is positive as long as
, maximum di↵erentiation is a dominant strategy for any given
b) µ 1 µ 2 : Newspaper 1 prefers maximum di↵erentiation if and only if µ 2  g(µ 1 , µ 2 ). This is equivalent to:
2 is the su cient condition for the maximum di↵eren-tiation to be a dominant strategy for any given (µ 1 , µ 2 ).
Step 2. -Given the uniqueness of newspaper 1's best response to newspaper 2's quality µ 2 , 27 it could take three values, 0, 1 2 or the solution of ⇡ 0 (µ 1 , µ 2 ) = 0 depending on the value of . Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium, µ ⇤⇤ , is: 2.1) (0, 0): This is as an equilibrium, if ⇡ 0 i (s i | µ i = µ j = 0) < 0 for i, j 2 {1, 2}. This is equivalent to  ( P ) ⌘ max
is an equilibrium, whereμ is the positive solution of Q(µ) defined as follows:
Step 3. -Now, we prove that µ ⇤⇤ is increasing in . For < , µ ⇤⇤ is zero, and for <¯ , µ ⇤⇤ is 1/2. So it is su cient to prove that µ ⇤⇤ is increasing in for 2 [ ,¯ ]. If 2 [ ,¯ ], µ ⇤⇤ is the positive solution of Q(µ) = 0. By fully di↵erentiating Q(µ ⇤⇤ ( ), ), we obtain
As c > 2 + 4 , the right term in the first line is negative. This together with the positivity of the second line implies µ ⇤⇤ 0 is positive.
Step 4. -In this step, we compare the quality of newspapers, µ ⇤⇤ to the case of no aggregator, µ ⇤ . We know 2cµ ⇤ 2 µ ⇤ = 2 + 2 . Substituting it into Q(µ ⇤⇤ ) = 0 we get,
where we use P µ ⇤⇤ > 1 to prove that the first term on the R.H.S. is positive. For the second term on the R.H.S. to be positive, it is su cient to have 2 since 1 µ ⇤⇤ 2 1. And 2 is implied by > 1 P µ ⇤⇤ 2. As a result, the aggregator improves the quality in the case of imperfect technology as well: we have µ ⇤⇤ > µ ⇤ . We now show how quality is a↵ected by P in this case. We have:
The second term in the first line is negative since c > 4 + 2 . The term in the second line is positive since P µ ⇤⇤ > 1 and
We also find that the e↵ect of P on newspapers' profits in case of imperfect technology is ambiguous too. Using the envelope theorem, we find:
Using the condition from the empirical results P µ ⇤⇤ > 1, we can show that 12 the direct e↵ect for given quality of newspapers is positive (i.e., @⇡ 1 @ P > 0). This is so as newspapers benefit more from readership-expansion e↵ect. However, the indirect e↵ect through the rival's quality increase has an ambiguous sign due to @⇡ 1 /@µ ⇤⇤ 2 . We can write
The aggregator's market share increases with the quality of newspaper 2 (i.e., @↵ Agg @µ ⇤⇤ 2 > 0) while 1's market share decreases with the rival's quality (i.e., @↵ 1 @µ ⇤⇤ 2 < 0). As P increases, the former is more likely to dominate the latter such that for large P ,
is positive.
B3. Extension III: Paywall
So far we assumed that advertising is the only source of revenue for newspapers. In this subsection, we consider the baseline model and allow each newspaper to charge a price. We assume that prices cannot be strictly negative.
In the presence of the aggregator, we find a su cient condition for each newspaper to find charging zero price profit-maximizing. For this purpose, we analyze the following three-stage game:
• Stage 1: each newspaper i simultaneously chooses s j .
• Stage 2: each newspaper i simultaneously chooses the price p i 0.
• Stage 3: each consumer chooses one among the two newspapers and the aggregator.
We assume that upon choosing a positive price, a newspaper blocks any incoming tra c from the aggregator. We have: PROPOSITION 6: Suppose A1-A3. In the presence of the aggregator, for any given pair of quality, (µ(s 1 ), µ(s 2 )) 2 [0, 1/2] 2 , it is a dominant strategy for each newspaper i (i = 1, 2) to choose p i = 0 if t  4 3 . The proof is provided at the end of this subsection. The proposition shows a very intuitive result: if competition among newspapers is strong enough, each newspaper finds charging zero price profit-maximizing. It also explains why newspapers with market power such as Financial Times or Wall Street Journal want to erect a paywall.
In the case of the three-stage game without the aggregator, we study the symmetric equilibrium in which both newspapers choose the same quality µ P and charge a strictly positive price p P . We have: From the first order condition with respect to µ 1 , we obtain the equilibrium quality under paywall, µ P , in the symmetric equilibrium, µ 1 = µ 2 , as follows.
The equilibrium profit under paywall is
(ii) We have (iii)
We know t 1 µ p is the equilibrium price and therefore is positive. We also know µ ⇤ > µ P . Therefore, ⇡ P > ⇡ ⇤ , if cµ ⇤ + cµ P 2 > 0. We have:
